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Original Parties [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291]: 
1. KaLynn Ninow, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
William Lowe; %J• Augusta Rose; T # Robert Mortensen; and jL• illi  ; m t  ; T # 
^ # Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah corporation, 
Respondents. 
Augusta Rose, 
Third-party Petitioner, 
v. 
KaLynn Ninow, vJ • Ryan Pahl, and / • Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-party Respondents. 
Additional party added by the trial court's URCP 42 order [April 15, 2004] 
consolidating two shareholder derivative actions during the pendency of the 
prior appeal [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]: 
8 Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah corporation, as relator in a 
shareholder derivative action against KaLynn Ninow to assert the rights of 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this 
matter, and as relator in a second shareholder derivative action against Ryan 
Pahl to assert rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, not a party to this matter, 
[formerly know, inter alia, as GHF Investments or GHF Investment 
Partnership], by and through its general partner, Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this action. Said shareholder 
derivate actions brought under Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case 
No. 030907064 were ordered consolidated April 15, 2004. (R. 1421-1424).] 
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REPLY POINT ONE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction only over orders appealed. 
In her1 brief, appellee KaLynn Ninow argues the April 26,2005, final 
order should be "disregarded" as "an anomaly" [Appellee Brief, p. 22] or it 
should be "regarded" as "effective." [Appelee. Brief, p. 24]. Appellants are 
not challenging that order. Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal. That order will 
stand. It is not being appealed. Since, on its face, is the final and appealable 
order disposing of all claims as to all parties, every action taken by the trial 
court after April 26,2005, that is being appealed, should now be reversed. 
REPLY POINT TWO 
The arguments in appellee's brief should be rejected on appeal. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF LOWE AND ROSE AS 
LOAN OFFICE OFFICERS/DIRECTORS SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
It was plain error to remove them on August 16, 2005, because they 
have a right to serve until their successors, if any, are lawfully qualified.2 
1
 Ms. Ninow's brief was filed only by her as appellee. Richard Ninow and 
Ryan Pahl are respondents to the Third-Party Petition that was reduced to a 
judgment as to Richard Ninow and dismissed as to KaLynn Ninow and Ryan 
Pahl before being erroneously resurrected in the order of August 16,2005. 
2This appeal involves only trial court activity that occurred after the filing of 
Notices of Appeal pertaining to Ninow v. Lowe I DBstate of Pahll. 2004 UT 
App. 291. Lowe and Rose own no shares. The May 1, 2003, order affirmed 
in that appeal dealt only with share ownership. Their interest was in getting 
that order affirmed on appeal as a final order before it was expanded to add 
language removing them. Since KaLynn Ninow controls less than 51% of 
the shares, the remaining share claimants possess an important legal right to 
preserve the status quo through passive boycott that thwarts a shareholder 
quorum and prevents Lowe and Rose from being removed and/or replaced 
unless a court expressly does so in a proper action with the proper parties. 
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A. Removal of Lowe and Rose was plain error. If it was invited, only 
Ms. Rose invited the court to err. Therefore, the court should consider 
William Lowe's appeal of that error. Since the proposed August 16, 2005, 
order was submitted only by Rose, no error was invited by Lowe and his 
appeal of that portion of that order is now before this court. Because the 
erroneous removal of Lowe and Rose was plain error, it should now be 
reversed even if the issue was not preserved by William Lowe. But it was 
preserved by him. While Mr. Lowe took no action under URCP 59 or 60 to 
further preserve that issue after the August 16, 2005, order, he had, prior 
thereto, consistently preserved it by carefully pointing out to the trial court, 
that he and Ms. Rose had never been removed and should not be removed. 
[inter alia R. 1988 and 1996] The August 16, 2005, order, by implication, 
orders that they had not previously been removed by prior shaireholder action 
or by the May 1, 2003, finding of undisputed summary judgment fact. But 
Mr. Lowe is appealing only the removal itself. The implicit order that there 
was no previous removal stands [as res judicata] due to lack of any cross-
appeal. And the removal was plain error, since [1] while Lowe and Rose are 
parties with standing to litigate in a judicial action to remove them, all share 
claimants must first be joined in the action, as must the corporation itself, 
and their competing claims must first subjected to a final order; and, [2] no 
personal jurisdiction has ever been exercised over that corporation so as to 
impose the May 1, 2003, judgment affirmed in Ninow v. Lowe I upon that 
corporation, and Ms. Ninow still controls only 3000 shares [less than 51%]. 
3Ms. Rose submitted the order as a proposed correct recordation of prior 
erroneous rulings. The court signed it. The error was a "chain error" that 
started when the court erroneously started entering orders post-April 26th. 
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B. The law of the case does not prohibit the consideration of Lowe and 
Rose's removal as officers and directors of the Loan Office. Instead, the law 
of me case establishes that they were officers and directors until they were 
removed in error on August 16, 2005.4 Ms. Lowe's argument that the court 
adjudicated the removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and directors in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Summary Judgment entered 
May 1, 2003, was implicitly rejected by the trial court on August 16, 2005, 
when she executed their removal that day via judicial order. That very clear 
implication within that order is res judicata, and there was no cross-appeal. 
Even if Ms. Ninow had cross-appealed, she would have faced tough 
sledding challenging the trial court's implicit rejection of her argument that 
the May 1, 2003, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Summary 
Judgment adjudicated the removal of officers and directors. Findings of fact 
entered with a summary judgment order merely memorialize the undisputed 
facts. By rule, under URCP 56, those findings are deemed undisputed only 
for purposes of the summary judgment order itself. Had Ms. Ninow stated 
as an undisputed fact that she controlled 100% of Microsoft shares and had 
removed Bill Gates, and had Lowe and Rose not disputed that for strategic 
reasons, that "undisputed fact" would have no legal force as an order that 
removed Bill Gates and replaced him with KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow 
and Ryan Pahl, since Microsoft Corporation was not a party. The findings 
similarly do not constitute the judicial removal/replacement, by order, of 
Lowe and Rose as officers or directors. The finding that they had been 
removed and replaced was not challenged in the prior appeal since it was, at 
4
 That is why the trial court placed them under injunction from time to time. 
[Had they not been officers, there would have been no need to enjoin them.] 
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best, only a Parduhn v. Bennett5 "subsidiary finding" that had no legal force 
or effect as a judicial order. It merely memorialized a fact not disputed for 
purposes of the summary judgment. And since the summary judgment order 
dealt itself only with shares [and does not remove or replace officers], Lowe 
and Rose, who claim no ownership of shares, simply pursued their strategic 
goal of getting the May 1, 2003, order affirmed on appeal as a final order in 
order to put a stop to vexatious litigation to which they were not the proper 
parties and to which Ms. Ninow failed/refused to join Pahl's Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc., as a party. The trial court implicitly agreed with the 
foregoing analysis by removing Lowe and Rose on August 16, 2005. Ms. 
Ninow's failure to cross-appeal means this implication is now res judicata. 
Mr. Lowe has standing to seek reversal of the challenged portion of 
the August 16, 2005, order as to both himself and Ms. Rose, since he has a 
^"Because a finding of fact need only be supported by sufficient subsidiary 
facts to justify it, one erroneous subsidiary finding does not necessarily 
render the ultimate factual finding erroneous as well/9 Pardulm v. Bennett 
2005 UT 22,124; 112 P.3d 495. While the finding that Lowe and Rose had 
been removed and replaced is erroneous, it is "subsidiary" [if not gratuitous], 
and it had nothing to do with the May 1, 2003, order's declaration of share 
ownership or the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in affirming 
that order in Ninow v. Lowe TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 291. It did not 
need to be challenged in that prior appeal because it creates no judicial order 
res judicata, by rule. The trial court, by order of August 16, 2005, implicitly 
rejected both the contention that Lowe and Rose had been removed by the 
May 1, 2003, "finding" and the contention that the said finding should have 
been challenged it in the prior appeal. That August 16, 2005, law of the case 
now stands due to the lack of any cross-appeal. As is the case with all of the 
controlling authorities cited by the appellants in their opening brief and their 
legal analysis presented in their opening brief based upon those controlling 
authorities, appellee has neither countered the controlling authorities nor met 
that legal analysis. Instead, she attacks the character of appellants' lawyer, 
but then fails to analyze the difference between an order and factual finding. 
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legitimate interest in having a functioning quorum of a board of directors on 
which serves as a director. The portion of the August 16, 2005, order that 
removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers and directors should be fully 
reversed as error, since they have a right to continue to serve as directors 
because PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., lawfully rejected shareholder 
attempts to remove them through its officer [Lowe], it was not a party, and 
no court with personal jurisdiction over the corporation has removed them.6 
The status of Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as the only quorum of directors 
with authority over Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Ms. Ninow's lack of 
authority, was put to rest on November 26, 2002. Full reinstatement of the 
November 26, 2002 judgment is sought through reversal of an April 6,2005, 
ruling on a June 12, 2003, order, so that the matter will be finally put to rest. 
But, in any event, KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl 
were never directors or officers by virtue of attempts by Ms. Ninow to take 
unanimous shareholder action, the May 1, 2003, order did not remove and 
6
 Mr. Lowe repeatedly gave notice to the trial court and to Ms. Ninow that, 
as an officer of the corporation, he had utilized the time between expiration 
of the TRO at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, and the entry of the preliminary 
injunction, to duly reject, on behalf of the corporation, Ms. Ninow's attempts 
to vote shares. That claim by him will stand until a court that has personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation itself litigates his assertion. Any contest 
between a shareholder who claims she has removed and replaced a corporate 
officer, and that officer who claims that as an officer he rejected that attempt 
to remove him and did so on behalf of the corporation, cannot be resolved in 
favor of the shareholder until the corporation is joined as a party. Until then, 
the officer remains an officer and the shareholder's vote[s] remain[s] a legal 
nullity recognized neither by the corporation nor by the Utah courts. Like 
most of the issues the remain unadjudicated, all of this will be settled by now 
reinstating the November 26,2002, default judgment on appeal. But if that 
is not done, then the unadjudicated matters are in need of further lawsuit[s]. 
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replace officers and directors because it contains no order language doing so, 
that order gave her no title to any to any shares free of adverse claims, and it 
gave her no voting rights [since PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., is not a 
party to that order], all of which is implicit within the trial court's decision to 
remove on August 16, 2005, instead of declining to sign the proposed order. 
Under that res judicata, the said corporation now has no officers, and 
that should be remedied by the Court of Appeals by reversing that portion of 
the August 16, 2005, order that removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers 
and as a quorum of directors so they can now serve until removed either by a 
quorum of shareholders or by a proper judicial action with the proper parties. 
II. THIS COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE 
APPEALED ORDERS. Appellee argues that since the April 26, 2005, 
order was the final, appelalable order that disposed of all claim? as to all 
parties, appellants should have appealed from that order, not the later August 
16, 2005, order. Appellee's argument has no merit under "law of the case." 
By erroneously entering the additional orders after April 26, 2005, the 
trial court erroneously turned the April 26, 2005, order into an interlocutory 
order by virtue of post-April 26, 2005, law of the case. After the trial court 
then [as a "chain-error"] signed another final order on August 16, 2005, filed 
on August 19, 2005, appellants, timely, appealed a part of that order as well 
as the orders entered prior to August 16,2005, being challenged on appeal. 
Something very similar happened with the November 26, 2002, default 
judgment. It was a final, appealable order. The URCP 60 motion did not 
render it interlocutory and the denial of the URCP 60 motion was itself final 
and appealable on the narrow issue of whether the denial was correct. But, 
with two final orders in place, the trial court then erroneously entered a June 
12, 2003, order that treated the orders as interlocutory under law of the case. 
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The time for appealing is computed based on the law of the case as it 
exists at the time appellants file their notice of appeal, not on the law of the 
case as it will exist after the appellants win that appeal. Appellants are not 
required to have the prescience [or arrogance] to appeal based on anything 
other than law of the case as it exists at the time they file a notice of appeal. 
III. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE THAT 
THE MAY 1, 2003, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS JUST A PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Because that ruling did not occur until after 
April 26, 2005, it was plain error to enter any ruling. Because a final order 
dismissing everything before the court had been entered on April 26, 2005, 
the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the sua sponte order turning the 
April 26, 2005, final order into an interlocutory order by ruling that the May 
1, 2003, summary judgment was a partial summary judgment and that the 
May 29, 2002, petition had survived the prior appeal and was still pending. 
Also, the May 1, 2003, summary judgment is not a partial summary 
judgment under the law of the case. No order on the merits of the May 29, 
2002, petition has been entered other than that May 1,2003, order [already 
affirmed in Ninow v. Lowe II. The real property issues that Ms. Ninow 
attempted to plead in her May 29,2002, petition have, since then, never been 
reached in any subsequent order on the merits. Everything was dismissed on 
April 26, 2005, and again on August 16,2005, after Ms Ninow abandoned 
the issues on April 6, 2005. The erroneous ruling concluding it was only a 
partial judgment should be reversed as an improper ruling on a moot issue. 
IV. THE MAY 2003 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DISPOSITIVE AND 
FINAL AS TO OWNERSHIP OF THE LOAN OFFICE SHARES ONLY 
AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THAT JUDGMENT. It does not bind 
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any persons or entities who were not made parties, it does not vest title in the 
shares free of adverse claims and liens, and it does not give Ms. Ninow any 
voting rights over shares [because PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., is not 
a party to that judgment]. Under relevant law of the case, that judgment is 
not dispositive as to the rights of the successor[s] to the parties to the May 1, 
2003, judgment. That very important question was duly decided by the trial 
court, against Ms. Ninow, when the trial court decided to dismiss Diamond 
Fork Land Company without prejudice instead of dismissing with prejudice. 
Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal and that order is res judicata as to the 
out-of-state share claimants who may well be awaiting the outcome of this 
appeal before reinstating the derivative lawsuit dismissed without prejudice. 
IV. IT WAS PREMATURE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY 
LOWE'S MOTION FOR LIABILITY ON THE UNDERTAKING. Mr. 
Lowe's motion asked only that the matter be set for hearing and that notice 
be given to the surety. That was the proper motion under URCP 65A(c)(3). 
The court should have set a hearing, not denied the motion out-of-
hand. The court lacked discretion to deny a proper motion for a hearing and, 
to the extent it had discretion, that discretion was abused. Two separate 
grounds for giving notice to the surety, so that he can litigate, are apparent. 
First, the reasoning under which the Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded the portion of the contempt order that held Mr. Lowe in contempt 
for violating the TRO in Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 
291, involved scaling-back a TRO that the trial court retroactively extended. 
Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained as a matter of law under the law 
of the case between the time that the trial court retroactively extended the 
TRO expiration time to cover conduct he had engaged in reliance on that 
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expiration time and the time that the Court of Appeals reversed the order 
that had retroactively extended the TRO's expiration time past the stated 
time. A second unadjudicated ground for holding a hearing now exists 
under the law of the case because the TRO was initially obtained based on 
allegations that Mr. Lowe, Ms. Rose, and Robert Mortensen were engaged in 
all manner of embezzlement, forgery, and malfeasance and that "irreparable 
harm" would be imminent if the TRO was not entered restraining them from 
acting in their offices as Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., officers and 
directors. No subsequent order on the merits has ever established any such 
misconduct on their part and the tribunal that hears the TRO undertaking 
matter might find from this that Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained, since a 
dispute over share ownership and real estate did not require any TRO. In 
fact, it would have been far better to leave the officers and directors of the 
corporation free from restraint/injunction and join the corporation as a party, 
so that the merits, rather than injunctions and contempt, could be litigated. 
It was premature to deny the request for a TRO undertaking hearing, 
and the matter should now be remanded with an order to hold the hearing. 
VI. THIS COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
THE JUNE 12, 2003, ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE NOVEMBER 26, 
2002, DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER. 
A. Lowe and Rose have standing to appeal the April 6, 2005, denial of 
their motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, order. As non-shareholders, Lowe 
and Rose had no standing to initially participate in the shareholder derivative 
action. But once a final and appealable judgment in favor of Diamond Fork 
Land Company as relator for Pahl's Salt Palace Loan was entered against 
KaLynn Ninow, and they relied upon it after the 3-month 60(b) deadline 
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elapsed, they gained such standing. They are expressly named in the 
judgment and personally relied upon it. When they were made parties to 
this proceeding, over their objection, through consolidation, they properly 
answered the complaint and also joined in the motion9 to vacate. [R. 1634] 
This court has jurisdiction on appeal over the November 26, 2002, 
default judgment because denial of the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, 
order that set it aside was made in an interlocutory minute entry on April 6, 
2005, that is part of the current appeal. The trial court had jurisdiction to 
grant or deny the motion on April 6, 2005, reverse the June 12, 2003, order, 
and reinstate the November 26, 2002, default judgment. The June 12, 2003, 
sua sponte order that set aside the November 26, 2002, default judgment did 
so without addressing the question of whether Ms. Ninow had shown any 
defense of at least ostensible merit. The trial court, at a minimum, should 
have vacated the June 12, 2003, order on April 6, 2005, and granted leave to 
Ms. Ninow to make such a showing. Since we now have the benefit of a 
subsequent trial court order, we now know that the sole defense raised by 
Ms. Ninow, that of preclusion, lacks merit under res judicata. The trial 
court dismissed Diamond Fork Land Company without prejudice instead of 
with prejudice. Ms. Ninow has not cross-appealed. This ground, preserved 
at [R. 1634], is a sufficient basis for now reversing the April 6, 2005, denial. 
8
 While their personal reliance on the November 26, 2002, judgment gives 
them personal standing, they also relied upon it as the corporate officers. 
9Because Diamond Fork Land Company was dismissed without prejudice on 
its own motion only after consolidation, that was not a final order as to all 
claiijis and parties and Lowe and Rose could join in the motion to vacate. 
The trial court never ruled that they could not do so. Instead, on April 6, 
2005, it denied the motion vacate in which they had joined and advocated. 
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B. Diamond Fork Land Company and/or its successors can still litigate 
ownership of Loan Office shares but do not need to do so yet and can wait to 
see if this court reverses the June 12, 2003, order and can wait to see if the 
November 26, 2002, judgment is reinstated and can then decide whether it is 
necessary to litigate the original shareholder derivative action. Dismissal 
without prejudice, therefore, did not conclude a major phase in the probate. 
And it did not conclude the shareholder derivative action because the 
court had not ruled on the motion to set aside the June 12, 2003, order and 
the court did not rule on that until April 6, 2005. That April 6, 2005, minute 
entry ruling was not reduced to an order that could have been appealed prior 
to the time that the court signed its final order on the May 29, 2002, petition 
on August 16, 2005, under law of the case. That final order was appealed. 
Law of the case created by a court governs all parties. There was no 
basis in Utah law for appealing a dismissal of Diamond Fork Land Company 
"without prejudice" on its own motion within 30 days of its entry. Instead, 
the issue of setting aside the default judgment was duly preserved by Lowe 
and Rose when they joined the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, order 
setting aside the default judgment. The court denied Lowe and Rose's 
motion on April 6, 2005. Both Lowe and Rose have standing and both 
Lowe and Rose appealed this issue in their opening brief. And appellee's 
footnote 4 on page 32 of her brief discussing that this issue was raised in the 
docketing statement by Ms. Rose and is raised on appeal by both appellants 
does not advance the analysis, as both gained standing once the November 
26, 2002, judgment was entered and they reasonably relied upon it after the 
3 month 60(b) deadline passed. The trial court denied their motion to vacate 
the June 12, 2003, order on April 6, 2005, implying that they had standing. 
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It is to be noted that Diamond Fork Land Company is not a party to 
this appeal. It, and/or its successors], can still sue over share ownership.10 
Lowe and Rose would have been laughed out of the appellate court if 
they had tried to appeal a dismissal without prejudice and would have been 
told to go back and get a final order on the motion to vacate a June 12, 2003, 
order that was referred in Ninow v, Lowe L that had still not been ruled on, 
and was not ruled on until April 6, 2005. Yet, appellee argues in her brief, 
apparently with a straight face, that a 30-day appeal deadline applied to that. 
VIL THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED AS PLAIN ERROR MADE WITHOUT JURISDICTION, 
a. This court cannot affirm the setting aside of the default judgment 
on June 12, 2003, on a ground not raised by motion below or on a ground 
that could have been raised below by a timely motion filed under URCP 
60(b)(1), (2), or (3). The general appellate proposition that an appellate 
court can sustain any order on any ground[s] does not apply when the 
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to do so and when the error by the trial 
court, as in this case, was jurisdictional. The June 12, 2003, order rules that 
motions that could be brought under 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) are all time-barred. 
10
 Unlike Lowe and Rose, who did not oppose the undisputed facts that gave 
rise to the May 1, 2003, judgment because they do not claim ownership of 
shares and because they strategically wanted to get a final order as soon as 
possible that did as little damage to their interests as possible, relators in a 
future shareholder derivative action would likely oppose those facts with Mr. 
Lowe's affidavit, filed below, that both the May and December agreements 
were accelerated and Gary Pahl transferred 3000 shares to the corporation in 
exchange for its unsecured obligation. At a minimum, a jury trial would be 
required. Ms. Ninow has produced nothing to counter Mr. Lowe's affidavit 
and, in a future shareholder derivative action, the court could not weigh Mr. 
Lowe's credibility and the matter would proceed to a jury trial of the issue. 
-12-
That part of the order is not being appealed. Once the trial court had ordered 
Ms. Ninow's URCP 60 motion to set aside the November 26, 2002, denied 
on May 2, 2003, it thereafter lacked jurisdiction to grant sua sponte relief 
under 60(b)(6), since Ms. Ninow did not then file a motion under URCP 
60(b)(6) after her motion was ordered denied under URCP 60(b). A trial 
court lacks any jurisdiction to grant URCP 60(b) relief sua sponte without 
having any motion to do so before it. The appellate court also lacks appeal 
jurisdiction to grant any relief sua sponte and only has jurisdiction to now 
reverse the June 12, 2003, order. Moores Federal Practice 3d, Sec. 60.62. 
b. To the extent the default judgment exceeds the scope of the relief 
prayed for in the complaint, it is not void, but is "voidable." A "voidable" 
judgment is effective until voided by grant of a timely motion under URCP 
60(b)(1), (2), or (3). The trial court properly ruled on June 12,2003, that 
relief that could have been obtained under URCP 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) is not 
available to Ms. Ninow. Ninow did not cross-appeal so as to challenge that 
ruling. The appellate court cannot grant such relief to her sua sponte. Id. 
c. Ninow's interest to and title in the Loan Office shares was never 
reached or attached by Lowe and Rose because they claim no interest in any 
of the Loan Office shares. Their personal interest is in setting aside a default 
judgment that impacts their rights and on which they had reasonably relied. 
There has been no order, finding, or showing that Ms. Ninow even 
possesses the share certificate issued by the corporation for the said 3000 
shares. Nor has there been any order, finding, or showing that a bearer 
certificate for the 3000 shares is not held out-of-state by a third part[ies]. 
Ms. Ninow's focus on the physical share certificate also misses the 
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legal significance of the default judgment as a shareholder "derivative" 
judgment. It is the corporation itself that has the right to designate its 
shareholders [subject to being overruled by a court with jurisdiction over 
the corporation], and whereabouts of the physical share certificate is of no 
consequence in a shareholder derivative judgment in which the rights of the 
corporation itself are adjudicated. Ms. Ninow had to defend the lawsuit, not 
default and then try to argue erroneously on appeal about a stock certificate. 
d. In this case, the court clerk signed the default certificate but did 
not enter it on the computer docket. There has been no showing of whether 
or not this is standard practice as to all default certificates or whether this 
was an omission by the clerk. The court ruled on June 12, 2003, [R. 2012] 
that the clerk signed the default certificate on November 25, 2002, the day 
before the default judgment was entered on November 26, 2002. Ms. Ninow 
argues that there was no default certificate at all. That is contrary to the law 
of the case in the ruling. That law of the case is not being appealed and Ms. 
Ninow did not cross-appeal. Once the default judgment itself was entered, 
that superceded any and all irregularities regarding the default certificate. 
Any issue about the absence of a computer docket entry recording 
the signing of the default certificate on November 25, 2002, should have 
been raised under URCP 60(b)(l), (2), or (3), within the 3 month time limit. 
e. The trial court's setting aside of the default judgment should be 
reversed because it was plain error in law under URCP 60. The case of 
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63 P.3rd 1008. 
was relied upon by appellee. It is distinguishable. That case turns upon its 
own unique procedural facts [See Swart v. State, 2004 UT App 209] and the 
majority and the dissent are in both in accord with well-settled Utah law and 
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well-settled precedent from FRCP 60(b) cases, which holds that 60(b)(6) 
relief cannot be granted when any unexcused lack of due diligence can be 
detected. That case turned on whether or not Ms. Oseguera had lacked due 
diligence and whether she was "affirmatively misled" so as to excuse such 
lack of due diligence. The "unique procedural facts" of Oseguera are light 
years away from the facts of the case at bar. Here, Ms. Ninow would have 
known she had filed her responsive motion well past the time stated in the 
summons had she been duly diligent. Due diligence would therefore have 
included checking for a default judgment. And there is no finding that she 
did not receive the Notice of Judgment in time to meet the 3-month deadline 
The June 12, 2003, order is erroneous because, while it does attempt 
to excuse some of the lack of diligence [she missed the 3-month deadline by 
a "relatively short time"], the trial court failed identify and dispose of some 
obvious unexcused lack of due diligence that bars relief under 60(b)(6) and 
thus the court abused its discretion by granting relief under URCP 60(b)(6). 
But before one even reaches those issues, one reaches a jurisdictional 
bar. Once the court denied the URCP 60(b) motion, there was no basis in 
law on which to then grant sua sponte relief under URCP 60(b), since Ms. 
Ninow was first required to file another motion to obtain any such relief.11 
While the court could grant relief under URCP 55 or URCP 60(a) sua 
sponte, it did not do so. This court lacks grounds and jurisdiction to do so.12 
11
 "Rule 60(b) contemplates relief only 4on motion.'" "[A] court may not 
grant relief under Rule 60(b) sua sponte." Moores Federal Practice 3d, Sec. 
60.62. Identical "on motion" language is found in URAP 22(b)(2). The 
judges of this appellate court don't grant enlargements of time sua sponte. 
12URCP 55 no longer applies since the default judgment itself was entered. 
No URCP 60(a) "clerical" errors are present. Entering a default when no 
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The November 26, 2002, default judgment was the final, appealable 
order that was not appealed within 30 days. When the court denied the Rule 
60 motion on May 2, 2003, that was a final appealable order on which Ms. 
Ninow could have appealed within 30 days on the narrow issue of denial of 
her motion. Instructing the parties to brief URCP 55 and 60(a) did not turn 
the November 26,2002, judgment, or, May 2, 2003, order, into interlocutory 
orders. A URCP 60 motion does not extend the appeal time or change the 
finality of a final order. URAP 4(b). Therefore, on June 12, 2003, the trial 
court could not revisit its May 2,2003, order that had denied the motion 
under URCP 60(b). That was a final order. Thus, Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) and Tremblev v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 
884 P.3d 1306 (Utah App. 1994), provide no basis revisiting it. Instead, as 
was pointed out in the motion to vacate the June 12,2003, order in which 
Lowe and Rose joined, preserving that issue, the trial court lacked any 
jurisdiction to enter the June 12, 2003 order. Those two cases involve the 
ability of a trial court to change its mind under URCP 54(b) prior to the 
entry of a final order. Reliance on P & B. Land v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 
274, 277 (Utah App. 1988), was also error. There was no default in law or 
fact in that case and there was no entry of default prior to the entry of default 
judgment. In the case now at bar there was a default in both law and fact 
when Ms. Ninow failed to plead or otherwise defend within the time set 
forth in the summons and then, several days later, upon application for a 
default and judgment, the clerk signed the default certificate on November 
responsive motion has made it into the file is not 60(a) "clerical" error even 
if a motion is filed the same day and it is not in the file through no fault of a 
movant. Signing a default judgment you would not have signed if you had 
known all the foregoing is not 60(a) "clerical" error. Both are 60(b) issues. 
-16-
25,2002. After judgment was entered on November 26,2002, Ms. Ninow 
could have appealed within 30 days or filed her motion under URCP 
60(b)(1), (2) or (3) within 3 months. And even in cases where there is no 
default in law or fact, under P & B Land the judgment is "illegal and 
"voidable" and is not "illegal and void." It was error for the trial court to 
conclude that it "makes no sense" not to void such a judgment if the 
defendant "did not comply strictly with the three month deadline." It 
"makes sense" to the courts that have made the settled and controlling 
precedent that the 3-month deadline is jurisdictional. It was also error to 
excuse Ms. Ninow because she missed the 3-month motion deadline by a 
"relatively short time." No jurisdictional bar known to law has that wiggle 
room, especially when third parties [Lowe and Rose] rely on the deadline. 
VIII. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS. Starting on May 20, 
2002, with the entry of an ex parte TRO, Ms. Ninow engaged Ms. Lowe and 
Ms. Rose in years of litigation in which she never obtained any order on the 
merits to which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose were proper parties until August 
16, 2005. Instead, Ms. Ninow has engaged in attempts to retroactively 
impose injunctions [the last one was lifted August 16, 2005] and endless 
serial contempt motions, which were finally disposed of on April 26, 2005. 
The final order, on the merits, signed on August 16, 2005, is the first 
order on the merits in which Lowe and Rose actually have a recognizable 
interest [since it removes them as officers and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace 
13
 There is no finding that Ms. Ninow's counsel did not receive the notice of 
judgment in time to meet the 3-month deadline. The negligently tardy filing 
is a jurisdictional bar. No exceptional circumstances completely beyond Ms. 
Ninow's control taking this from 60(b)(l)-(3) to 60(b)(6) are in the record. A 
basis for 60(b)(6) relief is not present. Moores Federal Practice 3RD 60.48, 
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Loan Office, Inc.], and it was, at long last, signed on August 16,2005, and 
entered on August 19, 2005. But it was error to remove them. That order 
was timely appealed. That appeal is before this court and it is not frivolous. 
The August 16, 2005, judicial removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and 
directors constitutes both an implicit order, by the trial court, that they had 
not theretofore been removed [either by judicial finding or shareholder 
action] and an order that judicially removes them by order. Mr. Lowe is not 
appealing the implicit order that he and Ms. Rose had never been removed 
prior thereto. He appeals only the portion of the order that removes them. 
The basis for assigning error to that removal order is: [1] Under both 
Utah law and the articles and bylaws of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., 
Rose and Lowe have a right to serve as the directors until their successors 
are qualified and no successors have ever been qualified by a shareholder 
action or the judicial finding, which is implicit in the judicial removal of 
Lowe and Rose by order on August 16, 2005. [2] After April 6, 2005, the 
only issues that remained before the trial court were the contempt motions. 
The trial court had jurisdiction only to find, or decline to find, parties in 
contempt, and if found to be in contempt, to limit remedies to those available 
for contempt. [3] After April 26, 2005, the court had no jurisdiction to enter 
any orders at all other than to dismiss any further contempt motions under 
res judicata. [4] It was error to remove directors without joining PahPs Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a party. [5] Since the shareholder derivative 
action was dismissed without prejudice, it was very premature to remove 
directors without awaiting a final order in a shareholder derivative action or 
an action brought by Ms. Ninow against the corporation in which Lowe and 
Rose were freed from injunction and could direct its defense as corporate 
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officers; [6] Since the November 26, 2002, default judgment had divested 
title to 3000 shares from Ms. Ninow and had judicially vested it in out-of-
state owners, the June 12, 2003, order setting aside the November 26, 2002, 
judgment did not place the 3000 shares back under Ms. Ninow's control.14 
She currently controls owns the legal voting title to only 3000 shares 
[50%], she cannot, unilaterally, convene a shareholder quorum and act, and 
her sole remedy, if any, is to file a shareholder derivative action of her own 
or to sue the corporation. But she should wait to do so until this appeal is 
decided. If the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's April 6, 2005, 
denial of the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order, then the 
November 26, 2002, judgment will be res judicata that fully precludes her. 
A. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose did not submit an order on a petition in which 
they had no interest and then appeal from the order claiming error. Mr. 
Lowe did not submit the order. Ms. Rose submitted it as a proposed correct 
recordation of prior erroneous trial court rulings, and the trial court signed it. 
Ms. Rose clearly had an interest in obtaining that order once the trial court, 
in error, started entering erroneous post-April 26, 2005, rulings and orders. 
B. Lowe and Rose clearly have an interest in the Diamond Fork default 
judgment and therefore continue to advocate reversing the April 6, 2005, 
14
 The trial court had jurisdiction to move title to the shares out-of-state on 
November 26, 2002, [because a probate court in which Ms. Ninow was the 
fiduciary had ruled they were in the estate] but it then lost in rem jurisdiction 
as soon as it did so. As a result, setting aside the default judgment on June 
12, 2003, did not vest the title to the shares back in Ms. Ninow. Title 
remains vested to this day in non-party out-of-state share owners or their 
out-of-state successors. There is no basis under Utah probate law for 
removing officers/directors since Ms. Ninow lost title to 3000 shares. The 
dismissal without prejudice of the shareholder derivitaive action is now res 
judicata as to standing of out-of-state owners and absence of preclusion. 
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order that denied their motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order 
that set it aside. They had no interest in the shareholder derivative action 
because they are not shareholders and have no kind of connection with or 
control over Diamond Fork Land Company. They serve at the pleasure of 
the shareholders, but have a right to continue to serve until their successors 
are qualified. Once the lawsuit was reduced to judgment on November 26, 
2002, and the 3-month deadline for moving to set it aside under URCP 60(b) 
(1), (2) or (3), elapsed, they reasonably relied upon it, it names them, and it 
impacts their right to act as officers and a quorum of directors of PahPs Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., the corporation whose rights were vindicated in the 
shareholder derivative judgment, and so they gained an interest and standing 
once the action was reduced to a judgment and they reasonably relied on it. 
C. Rose is not attempting to recover on the TRO undertaking. Lowe 
moved the trial court to set a hearing and give notice to the surety so the 
surety could litigate the matter. The court lacked discretion to refuse that. 
D. There is no basis for awarding fees for failure to observe appellate 
briefing requirements. Counsel for appellants has successfully briefed cases 
in which he has gained appellate reversals for clients in the Utah Supreme 
Court, in the Utah Court of Appeals, and in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. It is counsel's practice to rely upon the clerks 
of the appellate courts to "checklist" his briefs for compliance with appellate 
briefing requirements and he often has appellate clerks do that before he 
even takes the brief to Kinkos for copying. As to the substantive matters in 
the brief, the limit of the May 1, 2003, order affirmed in the prior appeal is a 
fairly straightforward matter of parties and preclusion. As to Ms. Ninow's 
literary criticism of writing style as "convoluted, verbose, rambling, and an 
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incredibly tedious read," counsel has reread his brief and he personally finds 
it to be clear, orderly, and cogent. As one who has written professionally as 
aDeseret Morning News staff writer, was the Commerce Editor for Utah 
Holiday Magazine, and still writes under pen names in Utah publications, 
counsel welcomes literary criticism, but adversarial litigation is probably not 
the best place to find it. In an interesting twist, at the same time counsel was 
reading the literary criticism proffered by the appellee, the Deseret Morning 
News reprised an article he wrote 25 years ago on the 25 anniversary of its 
publication, deeming it noteworthy enough to be a "week in . . . history."15 
REPLY POINT THREE 
Appellee's brief is frivolous, warranting attorney fees and costs. 
Litigation conducted prior to the notices of appeal16 in Ninow v. Lowe 
I rEstateofPahTK 2004 UT App. 291 is not before the court. There is no 
need to re-plow that ground and appellee's brief is frivolous in doing so. 
Since Judge Medley's dismissal without prejudice of Diamond Fork 
Land Company is now res judicata, binding on Ms. Ninow, establishing that 
Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahTL 2004 UT App. 291, neither precludes nor 
binds Diamond Fork Land Company or its successors and that they have the 
standing to sue derivatively if they care to, appellee's brief frivolous in that 
15Difficulty in comprehension sometimes has more to do with the reader than 
the writer. It is perhaps revealing that a litigant who never joined Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a necessary and indispensable party and thought 
she could get judicial relief on the merits by filing contempt motions now 
also discloses she had difficulty grasping the legal concepts of this appeal. 
16Ninow v.Lowe I consolidated two appeals, Nos. 20030169 and 20030458. 
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it argues unadjudicated matters yet to be litigated between proper parties. 
Appellee's brief is frivolous because the entire brief fails to draw any 
distinctions between appellants Lowe and Rose as between themselves, their 
counsel, and entities that are not parties to this appeal. There is no factual 
basis upon which to lump them together and her attempts to do so on appeal 
are a frivolous continuation of her all attempts to do so in the trial court that 
were rejected in the April 26, 2005, order. Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal. 
Ms. Ninow's attempt to "certify" in her brief that she never saw the 
April 26, 2005, order is frivolous. This appellate court is not equipped to 
adjudicate such a factual representation. To "certify" a fact to an appellate 
court that is not in the record is frivolous. A direct appeal from a trial court 
is not a matter in which an appellate court decides facts not in the record. 
Appellee's brief is frivolous because it tries to attack the character of 
appellants' counsel, attempts to attribute to appellants' counsel positions 
never taken by appellants' counsel, and does so without reference to the trial 
court record. The Utah State Bar's emphasis on civility and professionalism 
is encouraging to the dwindling few of us who remember the days when the 
Utah State Bar was a small but lively group of smart men and women who 
got together for law and motion calendars, and who disliked having to start 
dealing with lawyers who we did not even know because they were being 
pumped out of the two law schools in Utah in ever-increasing numbers. 
Ms. Ninow's brief argues matters to be litigated in derivative actions in 
the event this court does not reverse the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order. 
This is not the proper forum. The issue since the preliminary injunction was 
entered on May 31,2002, has been appellants' "purported right.. .to continue 
to operate this business." [Medley, J; T.64, Par. 24-25, 5/31/02], That issue 
was not concluded until August 16, 2005, by judicial removal that was error. 
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Standards of professionalism prevent the undue annoyance of having 
an adversary attributes positions to you that you have never taken. Diamond 
Fork Land Company duly acquired its interest in 1500 shares through Grand 
Staircase Land Company, which had acquired shares from Augusta Rose and 
Robert Mortensen in arms-length transactions at the time they were both the 
recognized record shareholders because no court had exercised personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation as a party so as to change its shareholder 
records. And the transaction occurred prior to the time that Augusta Rose 
retained Robert Henry Copier as her legal counsel. Appellee's inappropriate 
personal attacks in her brief such as "(t)he "Diamond Fork case was clearly a 
sham from its inception" [Appellee Brief, p. 44] is not supported by any 
finding by Judge Lubeck or Judge Hilder, who had the case before it was 
consolidated, or Judge Medley or Judge Lewis, who adjudicated it after it 
was consolidated into the probate proceeding now on appeal. The fact that 
Judge Medley dismissed the case without [not with] prejudice means that 
Diamond Fork Land Company and/or its successors can still pursue that 
litigation if they care to and the May 1, 2003, summary judgment that was 
affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe I [Estate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 291, 
will not have any preclusive effect barring that, since Judge Medley ruled 
against Ms. Ninow on that point when he declined to dismiss with prejudice. 
Accusing one's opposing counsel of a "sham" is an attack on that 
counsel's character. Equally offensive as [well as clearly incorrect] is Ms. 
Ninow's unsupported assertion that "Lowe and Rose continued to litigate 
the probate case . . . even though they expressly disclaimed any ownership in 
the real estate." [Appellee Brief, p. 44]. First of all, they claim no personal 
fee ownership, but Mr. Lowe does claim that interests in real estate were 
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pledged by PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., as sole partner in PahPs 
Land Partnership [fka, inter alia, GHF Investment Partnership] to secure all 
of his attorney fees in dealing with Ms. Ninow. That claim has never been 
adjudicated. Second, their participation in the attempts by Ms. Ninow to 
litigate real estate claims after May 1, 2003, was to demonstrate that no 
order on the merits as to any such claims could be entered because [1] the 
May 29, 2002, petition had not survived the May 1, 2003, final order; [2] 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., which was the sole surviving partner of 
GHF Investment Partnership, aka, inter alia, Pahl's Land Partnership, had 
not been joined as a necessary/indispensable party; and, [3] because neither 
the earlier summary judgment "finding" nor any attempted "unanimous 
shareholder action" had removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as the officers and 
directors, sundry Pahl family members lacked any authority, no one with any 
standing was litigating, and title should be quieted against them. No court 
order was ever entered adjudicating any of those issues, which were mooted 
when Ms. Ninow announced to the trial court on April 6, 2005, that she was 
no longer attempting to obtain a court order on any of the real estate claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The April 6, 2005, ruling denying the motion to vacate the June 12, 
2003, order should be reversed. Everything done between April 26, 2005, 
and August 16, 2005, should be reversed. Removal of Lowe and Rose by 
18
 In this case, third-parties who relied on the 3-month 60(b) deadline were 
made parties over their objection and then joined in the motion to vacate a 
sua sponte order entered after that deadline. If reversal of that order is not 
granted in this appeal, then URCP 60(b)(l)-(5) might as well be repealed, 
leaving 60(b)(6) as the rule under which trial judges can vacate any final 
judgment at any time, sua sponte, based on what "makes no sense" to them, 
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judicial order on August 16,2005, should be reversed.19 The April 6, 2005, 
ruling denying a TRO undertaking hearing should be reversed. Appellants 
should be awarded attorney fees/costs. Appellee's brief should be stricken. 
The court should expressly state that the April 26, 2005, order stands. 
SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL 
By this signature, counsel certifies that this is the reply brief of client 
William Lowe in his individual and personal capacity only and not in any 
representative capacity or in concert with any other person or entity. He 
further certifies that it is filed only by and on behalf of said client. It is not 
made on behalf of, or binding upon, any other persons or entities, except that 
William Lowe adopts by this reference all^f ^Vugusta Rose's Reply Brief, in 
its entirety, into this Reply Brief, pursuant to 
Augusta Rose has similarly adopted everything 
DATED THIS ^ 6 DAY OF JUNE, 
with no opportunity for any appellate review. What "makes no sense" to 
appellants is the conclusion in the June 12, 2003, order, that when the clerk 
signed the default certificate on November 25, 2002, a responsive motion 
was not in the court file through no fault of Ms. Ninow. She was in charge 
of responding to the summons. No application for default would have been 
made had she timely responded. Whether tardiness was Ms. Ninow's or her 
counsel's is completely irrelevant Moores Federal Practice 3rd 60.48(4)(b), 
19
 The remainder of the August 16, 2005, order remains for lack of a cross-
appeal. The entire order appears to be erroneous, but it is erroneous due to 
two "chain errors" that began when the court set aside the default judgment 
on June 12, 2003, and then entered orders after the April 26,2005, dismissal. 
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24-HOUR VOICE MAIL (801) 272-2222 
June 1,2002 
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc, 
1588 South State Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
Re: Shareholder Notice and Demand 
To whom it may concern: 
You are hereby notified to update the shareholder records of the corporation to reflect 
transfer on June 1, 2002, of 1500 shares from Augusta Rose to Grand Staircase Land 
Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111, and of 1500 shares from 
Robert K. Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
SLC UT 84111, with the latter 1500 shares being held in escrow by William Lowe, 3939 
Alberly Way SLC UT 84124, for Grand Staircase Land Company. The beneficial owner 
of the 1500 shares held in escrow by William Lowe for Grand Staircase Land Company is 
Diamond Fork Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111. Both 
new shareholders demand that you act to vindicate your rights as to claims by KaLynn 
Ninow, the personal representative of the estate of Gary G. Pahl, that she owns 3000 
shares that were held by William Lowe and as to which Gary G. Pahl transferred all his 
right, title, and interest to the corporation's treasury before he died, trespass by KaLynn 
Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and others upon the corporation's property, the 
conversion of its property to their own use, their acting without authority as to the real 
property and real estate owning partnerships in which the corporation is sole surviving 
general partner, and unauthorized transfer of corporate funds to their probate counsel. 
shareholder derivative action may follow after 9€Tclays if sufficient action is not taken. 
}fgQPJER, R^gisteped Agent 
Staircase LaruKfompany 
and Diaimmd Fork Land Company 
FIUD DISTRICT COUfiT 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727 Third Judicial D*tnot 
Attorney for Relator 
200 Metro Place NOV 2 6 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2803 e*_ . 
Telephone 531-7^23 
rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
rN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal Civil No. 020908627 
representative of the estate of Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Gary O. Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default 
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows: 
1. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the 
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the 
plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows. 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust ISQ0 shares (2S%) 
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for 
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner) 
Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust IS00 shares (1S%) 
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a 
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner) 
• i 
. i 
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2. No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default 
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares 
and ftilty and finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above. 
3. (n the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiffs successors to the 3000 
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or 
documents to vindicate and protect the rights of plaintiffs successors to the 3000 
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents. 
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is 
hereby decreed that any and all acts, filings* and transactions purportedly made or 
entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death 
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were 
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a 
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this 
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of 
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are 
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and void ab mmo. 
5. It is further decreed that no action, tiling, or transaction purportedly 
made or entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., from 
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved 
or ratified by a board of directors upon which William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
serve as directors, until such time us their successors, if any, are duly qualified, 
6. The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 
DATED THIS J j ^ D A Y OF NOVEMBER*<am^ 
B YTHE (&vfctiffl^&\ 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY vs. DOES I-V 
.SE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts 
'RRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
.RTIES 
Plaintiff - PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
Represented by: ROBERT H COPIER 
Plaintiff - DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY 
Defendant - KAYLYN NINOW 
Defendant - DOES I-V 
'COUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount. Due 
Amount Paid 
Credit 
Balance 
140.00 
140.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
lount Credit: 
Balance: 
140 
140 
0 
0 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.SE NOTE 
.OCEEDINGS 
-03-02 Case filed by karries 
-03-02 Judge LUBECK assigned. 
-03-02 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
-03-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 140.00 
-03-02 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
-04-02 Filed: First Amended Complaint 
'-07-02 Judge HILDER assigned. 
-18-02 Filed: Share Transfer Notice 
-24-02 Filed return: Summons 
140.00 
karries 
karries 
karries 
karries 
karries 
bryanp 
dpx 
bryanp 
bryanp 
•inted: 11/29/02 13:48:57 Page 1 
E NUMBER 020908627 Contracts 
NINOW, KAYLYN 
Personal 
October 19, 2002 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
26-02 Filed order: Default Judgment 
Judge rhilder 
Signed November 26, 2 002 
bryanp 
ted: 11/29/02 13:48:57 Page 2 (last) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL'S SALT PLACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex Ml- DIAMOND LAND FORK 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs\ 
KAYLYNN N1NOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
(Jury <V\ Pah I, deceased, and 
individually, 
Defendant, 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision, The 
parties briefed the original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which time the court 
indicated that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred, 
but that there might be grounds to sot aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule 
55, the underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & B Land v. Klungervik, 751 P,2d 
274 (Ut. App. 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the 
issue raised by the court. Now, having reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules 
as follows; 
Firsl, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v. Box Elder County and Trembly 
v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the 
coiut is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment has entered based on 
the court's bench ruling of May 2,2003. 
That ist the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or 
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any 
one ofthe first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion to 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 020908627 
Judge Robert K. ITilder 
1 
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extend that time, 
Hut, the eourt is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision, Osvgucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46 
(February 21,2003), thai Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, provides a clear basis for relief from the default 
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the 
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default 
results solely from court crrot, ptobabty even more manifestly than was the case in Oseguera. 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading 
was late, at the date the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date 
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been 
filed- The responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the 
court's fault, ' Tito critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend* (Rule 
55(a), UUCP) at the time the default was sought, 
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no 
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and 
voidable." 751 P,2d at 277, It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable 
if the court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did 
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the 
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainli ffdid 
not give prompt notice of the judgment. 
The court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP, 
under facts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors, 
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court: 
When the trial court's mistakes-not counselVare the reason a judgment is 
improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected 
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the 
mislakc as soon as it is called to the court's attention. 
Wat Para, 12, 
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6), 
t JRC1\ and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable 
time after becoming aware of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases, 
For 11 ic foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is 
1
 Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a 
subject of another motion. 
2 
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GRANTED mid the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading to which 
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks 
consolidation of this case with the earlier filed case before Judge Medley, that Motion must be 
di reeled lo Judge Medley. This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further 
Order is required. 
DATED this 12'" day of June, 2003. 
Court Judge 
3 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF GARY G. PAHL 
MINUTES 
PROBATE MINUTES 
Case No: 003901101 EF 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: April 6, 2005 
Clerk: 
PRESENT 
chells 
Petitioner's Attorney: HALA L AFU JR 
RAY G MARTINEAU 
Other Parties: SANDRA K WEEKS 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER 
Video 
Tape Number: 2:07 pm 
Counsel stipulate that the summary judgment is withdrawn. Counsel 
argues the order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show 
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling. Mr 
Copier argues the issue of the undertaking. Ms Weeks gives opposing 
arguments. The Court orders the motion for the undertaking is 
denied. Mr Copier makes a motion in regards to rule 11. A rule 11 
motion has not been filed, and therefore denied. Mr Copier makes a 
motion in regards to the ruling on 6/12/03 be vacated. The Court 
orders the motion to vacate is denied. Ms Weeks makes a motion to 
stay any remaining pending motions until a ruling on the order to 
show cause. Mr Copier stipulates to the motion. 
Page 1 (last) 
